Does reserve accumulation lead to higher currency-risk taking in the corporate sector? Firm-level evidence for Latin America by Sengupta, Rajeswari
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Does reserve accumulation lead to higher
currency-risk taking in the corporate
sector? Firm-level evidence for Latin
America
Rajeswari Sengupta
University of California, Santa Cruz
November 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38888/
MPRA Paper No. 38888, posted 18. May 2012 23:17 UTC
Does Reserve Accumulation Lead to Higher Currency-Risk Taking in the
Corporate Sector? Firm-Level Evidence for Latin America
Rajeswari Sengupta1
University of California, Santa Cruz
This Version: November, 2010
ABSTRACT
I explore an empirically robust but previously undocumented association between the foreign exchange re-
serves accumulated by central banks of emerging market economies and dollar-denominated debt held in the
balance sheets of non financial sector firms. Borrowing in dollars can have damaging e ects on corporate
balance sheets in the event of exchange rate depreciation. However, firms may discount such risk because of
the implicit insurance provided by the central bank’s ex-ante reserve accumulation: in the event of a currency
depreciation, firms may expect the central bank to stabilize the exchange rate using its stock of reserves.
Using a novel firm-level balance sheet database, I investigate this possibility for close to 1500 firms in six of
the largest Latin American economies, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Results suggest
that over the sample period, 1995-2007, an increase in the level of reserves is statistically and economically
associated with an increase in the dollar borrowing of non financial sector firms of these economies. This
could hint at a possible paradox: a higher level of reserves need not necessarily signify an economy that
is more resilient to shocks. While reserve accumulation enables governments to weather macroeconomic
risks arising from sudden stops in international capital flows, it can also increase the vulnerability of the
corporate sector to currency risks by distorting incentives. Thus central banks, while formulating their for-
eign exchange intervention policies, may need to take into consideration the impact of the resultant reserve
stockpiling on the private sector.
JEL Classification: F3; F4
Keywords: Foreign exchange reserves, foreign currency denominated debt, corporate risk-taking, currency
depreciation.
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The objective of my paper is to throw light on the issue of corporate foreign currency debt in
context of the international reserve (henceforth IR) accumulation policy of central banks in emerging
market economies (henceforth EMEs). The topic of IR accumulation is an old one but has recently
gained new prominence as the level of IR has increased dramatically over the last two decades in
EMEs. In recent times, central banks of countries across the world especially EMEs, have been ac-
tively intervening in foreign exchange markets further adding to the existing stockpiles of IR. In this
context, the findings of my current study have important policy relevance. Foreign exchange reserves
maybe accumulated by the central banks of EMEs to provide insurance against financial instability
triggered by sudden-stops in international capital flows (precautionary motive).2 IR can enhance
the ability of economies to defend themselves against macroeconomic shocks, provided the actions of
the private sector are held constant. In practice however, private sector responses to central banks’
IR accumulation policy maybe endogenous. A large stockpile of reserve assets can act as a public
demonstration of a commitment to exchange rate stability. A country with su⌃cient liquidity can
try to sustain the high value of its currency by buying domestic assets and selling reserves. Such
country-level insurance may in turn induce foreign currency-debt issuing corporations in EMEs to
perceive that they are implicitly insured against currency fluctuations.3 Thus a reserve hoarding
policy may increase the vulnerability of the corporate sector to currency risks by distorting incentives.
On one hand, interest rates on dollar debt are lower than on domestic currency debt. On the
other hand, dollar debt exposes firms to a currency mismatch between foreign currency liabilities
and domestic currency revenues, thereby increasing the vulnerabilities of firms to exchange rate
depreciations.4 However, firms may discount such risk because of the implicit insurance provided by
the central bank’s ex-ante reserve accumulation: in the event of a currency depreciation, firms may
expect the central bank to stabilize the exchange rate using its stock of reserves. In this paper, us-
ing balance sheet information for close to 1500 firms in six of the largest Latin American economies
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) over the period 1995-2007, I explore the
following question: Does hoarding of reserves by the central banks of EMEs encourage non financial
sector firms of these economies to borrow more in dollars?
As pointed out by Bordo, Meissner and Stuckler (2009), all else equal, dollar debt exposure in
the face of a sudden and large depreciation of exchange rate may make private sector debt default
and hence corporate bankruptcies, more likely. According to Krugman (1999), there exists a type
of external diseconomy to borrowing in foreign currencies. The decision by an individual firm to
2See, for example, Aizenman and Lee (2007). Another possible motivation lies in central banks’ e orts to achieve a
‘competitive’ real exchange rate to boost exports (mercantilist motive), with reserve accumulation being a by-product
of such a strategy. Henceforth, international reserves (IR) and foreign exchange reserves to be used interchangeably.
3Henceforth, dollar debt and foreign currency debt to be used interchangeably.
4The role played by currency mismatch in corporate balance sheets in particular, has been theoretically explored,
among others by, Chang and Velasco (1999), Krugman (1999), Schneider and Tornell (2001), Caballero and Krishna-
murthy (2003) and Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2004). Hausman, Panizza and Stein (2001) also provide evidence
that most contracts between lenders and borrowers in emerging markets take the form of dollar debt.
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borrow in dollars imposes costs on the rest of the economy when real depreciation interacts with
capital-market imperfections to cause economic distress. Hence the issues to be considered have
crucial implications for academic researchers and policy makers, alike. My choice of Latin American
(henceforth LATAM) economies in the sample has been primarily dictated by data availability. As
pointed out by Eichengreen and Hausman (1999), significant dollar borrowing by non financial sector
firms was a major reason for severity of the 1990s LATAM financial crises.
Many observers argue that the large buildups of unhedged foreign liabilities in the corporate
sector of EMEs have been caused mainly by fixed or pegged exchange rate regimes. Other authors,
however, have claimed that the problem of private sector dollar indebtedness extends across EMEs,
regardless of exchange rate regimes.5 Although the debate among academicians and policy makers
has been intense, no real consensus has been reached on the issue of firm-level dollar borrowing in
EMEs, and the determinants thereof. While during a fixed exchange rate regime, firms have a higher
incentive to borrow in dollars, as the economy shifts to a flexible regime, ideally dollar debt should
decrease. However, the central bank of the economy may exhibit a lower credibility of maintaining
a regime of float. In other words, the central bank may use its stock of foreign exchange reserves
and actively intervene in the foreign exchange market to stabilize the exchange rate.6 Despite the
shift away from fixed exchange rates, central banks’ holding of dollar assets has risen sharply in
recent years (see, for example, Aizenman and Lee, 2007; and Aizenman, 2007). Such ex-ante reserve
accumulation may provide an implicit guarantee to the firms who in turn may consider themselves
insulated against the currency risk associated with incurring dollar debts and continue to borrow
in dollars.7 In other words, as a result of this perception of costless insurance or security, firms’
share of liability dollarization (share of dollar denominated debt in total debt) may go up as central
bank’s stock of reserves increases.
My paper makes two important contributions to an understanding of the external financing
choices of EME firms. Firstly, to the best of my knowledge, the association between central bank
foreign exchange reserves and EME firms’ foreign currency denominated debt has not been empir-
ically explored before in the relevant literature. One exception is a recent study by Tong and Wei
(2010) who investigate the e⇤ect of a country’s reserve holding on its corporate firms’ risk taking as
proxied by domestic debt and find that higher level of reserves is indeed associated with higher risk
5See, for example, the evidence in Hausman et al. (2001) of the prevalence of dollar denominated debt in economies
with fixed as well as flexible exchange rate systems. They argue that this problem arises due to the fundamental
inability of EMEs to borrow abroad in their own currencies, a problem they refer to as the ‘original sin’.
6Hausmann et al. (2001) argue that given the persistence of dollar liabilities in the private sector, central banks will
float, but with a life jacket, i.e. they let the exchange rate float over some range but aggressively intervene if a certain
threshold is reached. Exchange rate stabilization helps avoid damaging e ects of a major currency depreciation on
the balance sheets of a country’s financial and non financial sectors.
7See, for example, Chamon and Hausmann (2005) who argue that if every atomistic firm expects all other firms
to borrow in dollars, then it will also expect the central bank to stabilize the exchange rate at the expense of
higher volatility of the interest rate (and hence hold higher reserves, as a precaution against a mass bankruptcy).
Consequently, the firm itself will end up borrowing in dollars as well.
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taking. However they do not look into the e⇤ect of reserves on firms’ foreign currency denominated
debt. Several studies, mostly theoretical, endogenize the currency composition of private sector
debt.According to one approach, foreign currency debt arises in the banking sector because of the
moral hazard created by systemic bailout guarantees doled out by the central bank as a lender of
last resort.8 Dooley (2000) points out that fixing the exchange rate o⇤ers free insurance to firms
that borrow in dollars, thereby encouraging dollar borrowing and creating moral hazard. Distortion
of private sector incentives owing to implicit free insurance is also behind the government-bailout-
type models, such as in Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001). In their view, stabilizing the
exchange rate creates moral hazard. It conveys the impression that the government is socializing
the exchange risk, thereby encouraging the private sector to accumulate unhedged exposure. What
has largely been neglected in the relevant literature is the possibility that recourse to self-insurance,
or precautionary policies by central banks, may have diminished the incentives for firms in EMEs to
reduce the extent of their dollar borrowing. The reserves-literature does not explore the impact of
central banks’ reserve hoarding policies on corporate risk-taking behavior. The currency mismatch
literature looks into the the dynamics of dollar-debt, but not the response of corporations to reserve
accumulation and neither does the corporate finance literature. The line of thinking expressed in
my paper can also be linked to the famous ‘fear of floating’ hypothesis as proposed by Calvo and
Reinhart (2002).9
The second contribution of my paper is the use of a novel firm-level balance-sheet database to
explore the possible association between central bank’s reserves and EME firms’ dollar debt.10 Most
of the existing work in the relevant literature remains theoretical, primarily owing to the dearth of
appropriate data on firm-level dollar denominated assets and liabilities. Yet, this issue remains in
essence one that merits careful examination of suitable data. At the macro level there is a substantial
literature documenting the high levels of foreign currency debt in EMEs.11 However, to understand
whether depreciations have a contractionary impact on these firms, EME firm-level studies on dollar
debt have mostly documented the impact of currency depreciations on firm investments or net worth
8See, for example, McKinnon and Pill (1998); Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001) and Schneider and Tornell
(2001).
9Moreover, the emphasis in the literature has usually been on the private banking sector’s currency exposure but
in any economy the corporate sector is much bigger and yet, few studies have looked at the relevant micro-level data.
Banks’ exposure may not necessarily appear as risky because they borrow as well as lend in dollars but if they lend
to firms with limited or no dollar revenues or assets and if exchange rate depreciates, then the likelihood of corporate
bankruptcy goes up. This in turn can set o  a ripple e ect through the entire economy. In other words, currency
exposure of banks’ clients matter too.
10The database used in this study was put together by Kamil (2004). In 2002, the Research Department of the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) spearheaded a LATAM research project called ‘Debt Composition and Balance
Sheet e ects of Exchange Rate Fluctuations in Latin America: A firm-level Analysis’. One of the main goals of this
project was to collect firm-level data on liability composition for a large sample of LATAM companies. As a result
of this project, new firm-level information was collected by the IDB for major LATAM economies such as Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. This data was further enhanced and extended by Kamil (2004, 2009)-the
source of all the firm-level information used in the current study.
11See, for example, Arteta (2002), Ize and Yeyati (2003), Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2004).
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in the presence of dollar-debt.12 There is much less empirical work on the determinants of dollar
debt at the micro level. Few exceptions include Cowan, Hansen and Herrera (2005), Kamil (2009),
and Patnaik and Shah (2010) who find that the shift to floating exchange rate regimes has reduced
corporate liability dollarization in EMEs. The current study is also closely related to Schmukler and
Vesperoni (2001) who analyze the e⇤ect of financial liberalization on firms’ financing choices during
the 1980s and 1990s for a sample of EMEs. However, in absence of data on the currency composition
of firm assets and liabilities, they are unable to examine the factors influencing firm use of foreign
currency denominated debt.
My paper sheds light on the e⇤ects of reserve accumulation and other firm-level and country-level
determinants, on firm-level dollar borrowing. My focus on corporate balance sheet data is useful in
understanding the e⇤ect of country-level insurance on dollar borrowing from the point of view of
the firms, and also allows me to exploit the heterogeneity across firms and countries in my sample.
Regression analyses conducted on the panel data-set containing firms from all six economies yield
several key findings. An increase in foreign exchange reserves is found to have a positive impact
on the share of dollar debt held in the non financial sector firms of these economies. This e⇤ect is
significant, even after controlling for firm-level characteristics (i.e. factors a⇤ecting individual firm’s
decision to self-select into dollar debt) as well as macroeconomic factors (i.e. common factors that
may influence all firms’ dollar borrowing decision). The latter include real exchange rate volatility, fi-
nancial openness and di⇤erential borrowing cost between domestic and foreign economies. Secondly,
firm specific features, such as the share of exports in sales, firm size, foreign ownership and access to
international equity markets, are found to have a significant impact on firm dollar borrowing, across
all economies in my sample, much more than the country-level control variables. The results of my
analysis also survive a series of robustness checks.
1 Data and Methodology
1.1 Empirical Model
I use annual data for the non financial sector firms of six LATAM economies. My analysis covers the
period from 1995 to 2007, chosen primarily on the basis of firm-level data availability. My baseline
specification is given by the following regression model:
Dict = ⇥0 + ⇥1FXRct 1 +X ⇤ict⇥2 + Z
⇤
ct⇥3 + crisis+ ⇤ct + ⇧ict, (i = 1..N ; c = 1..K; t = 1..T ), (1)
where i denotes firms (N=1573), c countries (K = 6), and t time (T = 16). Dict is the ratio of dollar
liabilities to total liabilities of firm i in country c at time t, FXRct 1 is the ratio of reserves to GDP in
12See, for example, Bleakley and Cowan (2008).
5
country c at time t-1, X ⇤ict is a vector of firm-level control variables, Z ⇤ct denotes a vector of country-
level control variables, crisis is a dummy variable and ⇤ct are country-year dummies.13 According
to my hypothesis, the implicit guarantee provided by ex-ante reserve accumulation may result in
firms increasing their dollar-denominated liabilities relative to total liabilities. Thus, I would expect
⇥1 to have a positive sign in my estimations. In order to account for possible endogeneity, I lag the
reserves variable by 1 period so as to avoid potential feedback e⇤ect from corporate dollarization
and associated financial instability into central banks’ decision to accumulate reserves.14 I cluster
the standard errors at the country-year level given that my main independent variable of interest
(foreign exchange reserves) varies at this level.
One problem with the baseline specification is that a large fraction of firms have zero dollar debt
every year (roughly 23 percent in total). In other words, observations for dollar debt are left-censored
at 0. In order to account for this type of a corner solution in the choice problem of firms, I estimate
equation (1) using a Tobit (censored) model for a limited dependent variable.15 The structural
equation of my Tobit model is as follows:
Dict = D⇥ict = ⇥0 + ⇥1FXRct 1 +X ⇤ict⇥2 + Z ⇤ct⇥3 + crisis+ ⇤ct + ⇧ict ifD⇥ict > 0, and (2)
Dict = 0 if D⇥ict ⇤ 0, (3)
where the residuals are iid and normally distributed with mean 0 and variance ⌃2. D⇥ict is a latent
variable observed for values greater than 0 observed Dict is the observed level of firms’ liability
dollarization (i.e. share of dollar liabilities in total liabilities).16
To facilitate comparison across heterogenous firms with varying degrees of leverage, my dependent
13Using nominal GDP may introduce cyclicality and so, I re-estimated equation (1) using purchasing power parity
(PPP) based measures of GDP. Results have not been reported here for brevity but are available upon request.
14I also estimated equation (1) using contemporaneous reserves to GDP ratio and the results were found to be
weaker (in terms of coe⌅cient magnitude as well as the model’s explanatory power). Furthermore I also used 1 period
lagged reserves as an instrumental variable, in order to deal with potential endogeneity issues. Results are robust to
these specifications and are available upon request.
15Fixed e ects regressions run on a panel data set of all firms of all six countries in the sample are reported in Table
C in the Appendix. Results are robust to both the Fixed E ects and Tobit Model specifications. For further details
on the Tobit model, see Technical Appendix in section (5.1).
16My baseline Tobit model estimations quantify the overall impact of reserves on firm liability dollarization with
non-linear maximization of a log-likelihood function. The Tobit model weighs censored and uncensored observations
di erently from the standard normal. The net result is a combination of a Probit likelihood function for censored
values and the likelihood of a normal distribution. Maximizing it over unknown parameters ( 1, 2, 3, ⇥ct) we obtain
the marginal e ect on the latent variable (D ict). However I am interested in the e ect of the explanatory variables
on the observed Dict (i.e. dollar debt ratio of firms). In this model, the marginal e ect of each variable on the
expected value of the dependent variable is given by the marginal e ect on the latent variable times the probability
that the latent variable is above the censoring limit (in case of left censoring as is our case wherein dollar-debt is left
censored at 0). It is this overall marginal e ect, that I report and discuss in Section (2). It can be referred to as the
overall e ect as it sums both the e ect on positive and censored values of dollar-debt. Since the dependent variable
is censored and Tobit is a non-linear model, it is not technically feasible to use the fixed e ects estimator. Moreover
fixed e ects estimator in non-linear models are inconsistent with the exception of Logit and Poisson Models (Hsiao,
2003).
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variable is firm-level dollar debt normalized by total debt. Subsequently, I also estimate equation
(1) using two alternative measures of firm liability dollarization. The explanatory variables can
be grouped into two main categories: (i) firm-level microeconomic variables, and (ii) country-level
macroeconomic indicators. The variables in the first category have mostly been identified in the
corporate finance literature as important factors influencing firm financing choices.17 The group of
firm-level variables consists of the ratio of exports to sales for each firm, firm size (proxied by the
natural logarithm of total assets of each firm expressed in US dollars), foreign ownership dummy
variable that takes a value 1 if the firm in question is foreign-owned, and access to international
equity markets, captured by a dummy variable that takes the value 1 from the year that a given
firm starts trading (or raising capital) in a foreign equity market, and 0 otherwise.
The second category comprises country-level macroeconomic variables that may a⇤ect firm dollar
borrowing. This includes the ratio of IR to GDP for each country, which is the focal point of my
analysis, volatility of real exchange rate (measured using the annual standard deviation of monthly
real exchange rates) interacted with two dummies respectively representing depreciation and ap-
preciation of the exchange rate, di⇤erential borrowing cost measured using the di⇤erence between
lending rates of each country and the LIBOR of similar duration and financial openness measured
by the ratio of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP. The controls are explained in further detail
in Section (2). The LATAM economies under consideration experienced a series of financial crises
during the sample period.18 In order to control for these periods, I incorporate a dummy variable,
crisis that takes a value 1 for the years 1995 to 2002.19 Data sources and definitions are detailed in
the Appendix.
1.2 Data Sources
Data on firm-level dollar variables have been collected from the database described in Kamil (2004,
2009).20 Rather than only the most liquid firms or firms with the highest market capitalization, as
has been common in other related cross-country studies, all publicly traded firms that are listed or
have been listed in these economies stock exchanges are included.21 Most of the information has
17See, for example, Booth, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001), Myers (1977) and Graham and Harvey (2001).
18The crisis episodes include (a) Mexican tequila crisis of 1995 that also a ected Argentina, (b) Asian currency
crisis of 1997 and the Russian crisis of 1999 that had contagious e ects in the LATAM region, (c) Brazilian Real crisis
of 1999, and (d) the Argentine crisis of 2001-2002.
19I also consider a few additional country level explanatory variables such as external debt to GDP ratio, current
account position of each country, political risk and a measure of financial depth of each country proxied by the M2 to
GDP ratio- in each of these cases, my results remain the same and are available upon request.
20The database does not include commercial banks, brokerage firms, financial groups, insurance companies and
mutual funds. Capital structure of financial-sector firms is not comparable with behavior of non financial firms,
due to banking regulations impacting currency mismatches on balance sheets. For other studies that have used this
database, see, Galindo, Panizza and Schiantarelli (2003), Cowan, Hansen and Herrera (2004), Pratap, Lobato and
Somuano (2003), Benavente, Johnson and Morande (2003) and Bonomo, Martins and Pinto (2003).
21See, for example, Allayanis, Brown and Klapper (2003).
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been collected from annual reports and audited corporate filings obtained from local stock markets
and regulatory agencies in each country. Prior to using the data I checked for accounting incon-
sistencies. While there is no clear distinction regarding the specific currencies in which the debt is
denominated, following Kamil (2009) I assume that majority of the debt is issued in US dollars.
Tables 1 and 2 respectively report the number of firms and descriptive statistics (mean and stan-
dard deviation) of the important variables (both firm-level and country-level) used in the analysis.
Panel A in Table 2 reveals the extent of diversity in the average firm-level dollar debt among the
economies in the sample. The average share of dollar debt in total debt of firms is reasonably dif-
ferent between Argentina, Mexico and Peru on one hand (more than 50 percent), and Brazil, Chile
and Colombia on the other (15 percent). The overall average across all economies is 29 percent.
With regard to reserves, Chile has the highest reserves to GDP ratio (19.1) followed by Peru (17.3).
The evolution of the reserve to GDP ratio for each country over time, as well as of the respective
country firm-level liability dollarization ratios can also be seen from Figure 1. Figure 2 shows the
time-series evolution for both variables for the pooled-sample of all six countries taken together.
2 Estimation Results
The results of the Tobit estimations (equation 1) on the panel data set for all firms in all six countries
in the sample are presented in Table 3. These are my baseline results on the e⇤ect of reserves on
firm dollar debt, and their robustness is examined in subsequent analyses. The e⇤ect of reserves to
GDP and firm-level control variables are reported under the columns labeled (1) and (2). Column
(3) shows the contributions of other country-level variables.
In column (1) the coe⌃cient estimate of reserves to GDP (reserves/GDP) is highly significant
with a p-value less than 0.001. It has a positive impact on the ratio of firm-level dollar debt to total
debt. Without controlling for the e⇤ects of other country-level determinants, an increase in reserves
to GDP by one standard deviation (or 0.06 according to Table 2) is associated with a higher dollar-
debt ratio by by 4.3 percentage points (0.72x0.06). This e⇤ect is consistent with my hypothesis
that a higher level of reserves i.e. a higher country-level insurance against financial instability may
lead the EME firms to borrow more in dollars, possibly due to the underlying implicit guarantee
of exchange rate stabilization using the reserves and resultant insulation from currency risk. This
specification accounts for around 54 percent of the variation in the share of dollar denominated debt
in firm balance sheets.
All the firm-level explanatory variables are highly significant with the expected positive signs.
Exports to sales (exports/sales) is statistically significant and the sign of its estimated coe⌃cient
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is in accordance with theoretical predictions. For instance, as discussed in Caballero and Krishna-
murthy (2003), exporting firms may have better access to international credit markets, as they can
pledge their export receivables as collateral to foreign lenders (Jeanne 2000). Also, they are likely to
be able to better hedge their currency exposure using their dollar denominated export earnings, and
thus may be expected to issue higher dollar debt as compared to non-exporting firms. Consistent
with this prediction, in my case, the significant and positive coe⌃cient of the exports to sales ratio
across all specifications implies that an exporting firm is more likely to borrow in dollars.
Firm size (firm size), measured by the natural log of total assets, is also positive, and statistically
significant in all of the specifications in Table 3. This is consistent with the hypothesis that larger
firms are likely to have more assets to pledge as collateral, and hence will be able to issue more dol-
lar debt (Allayanis, Brown and Klapper, 2003). Access to international equity markets (adr gdr),
captured by a dummy variable, is also significant with a positive sign indicating that foreign stock
market listing enables a firm to signal its superior quality to creditors (Allayanis et al, 2003), and
hence facilitates the issuance of dollar debt. Finally, forown, the dummy variable representing for-
eign ownership of a firm is also positive and significant; these firms possibly have better access to
external credit markets and hence can issue more dollar denominated debt as compared to their
domestic counterparts.
In column (2) of Table 3, I report the e⇤ects of adding the di⇤erential cost of borrowing (r  r⇥),
real exchange rate volatility interacted with a depreciation and an appreciation dummy (rervol*dep
and rervol*app), and financial openness (finopen), to the baseline regression specification. As pre-
dicted by the static trade-o⇤ theory (Allayanis et al, 2003), the choice between local and foreign
currency debt should be an increasing function of the benefits of each type of debt and a decreas-
ing function of the costs of debt. One potential cost is the di⇤erence between interest rates in the
domestic and the foreign borrowing markets.22 Thus, I hypothesize that the di⇤erence between
domestic and foreign interest rates should be positively associated with the use of foreign currency
denominated debt. In the absence of precise data on corporate bond spreads, I proxy the di⇤er-
ential borrowing cost in domestic and foreign capital markets (r-r* ) using the di⇤erence between
the lending rates of respective economies and LIBOR of same maturity.23 As seen in Table 3, the
di⇤erential borrowing cost variable does have a positive sign, however it is not significant.24
22Graham and Harvey (2001) find that 44 percent of firms responding to their survey report that lower foreign
interest rates are ‘important or very important’ in the decision to use foreign debt.
23I also used the di erence between yields on domestic sovereign bonds and US Treasury Bonds of the same maturity,
with data from Datastream the Macroeconomic Databases For Emerging And Developed Markets (CEIC). Results
were the same and have not been reported here for brevity but are available upon request. I also tried to proxy the
cost by the di erence between CDS spreads of US and LATAM economies-however time series data availability for
the LATAM economies prior to 2004 was a major issue.
24It is possible that there is a non-linear e ect of this di erential cost of borrowing on firm decision to issue dollar
debt. Up to a certain threshold of r   r⇥, firms may find it more profitable to issue peso debt instead in order
to avoid potential bankruptcy arising out of currency depreciation. Beyond a threshold, when peso debt becomes
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Higher real exchange rate volatility, when interacted with the depreciation dummy implies higher
currency fluctuations in the direction of currency depreciation. Fluctuations in this direction imply
higher risk associated with issuing dollar debt, and should lead to a lower dollar debt to total debt
ratio.25 My results show that real exchange rate volatility has a negative sign when interacted with
the depreciation dummy and it is statistically significant as well. On the other hand, the same
real exchange rate volatility variable, when interacted with the appreciation dummy is positive and
significant. The results imply that if the real exchange rate is appreciating, firms are willing to
tolerate higher volatility of the exchange rate and continue to borrow in dollars. This too is intu-
itive because an appreciating exchange rate eases the dollar-debt burden of leveraged firms (just
as a depreciation worsens the burden). Financial openness too has the expected positive sign (a
higher level of financial openness should be associated with a higher level of dollar borrowing) and
is highly significant. Finally, the dummy variable, crisis, is highly significant with a positive sign in
both Columns (1) and (2) implying that during the relatively volatile periods when these LATAM
economies experienced financial crises, corporate dollarization went up significantly.
In the presence of these country-level variables, the e⇤ect of the reserves to GDP remains signif-
icant and positive, and in fact increases in magnitude. After controlling for the e⇤ects of the micro
and macro determinants of dollar debt, an increase in the reserves to GDP by one standard deviation
(or 0.06 according to Table 2) is now associated with a higher dollar-debt ratio by 6.7 percentage
points (1.12x0.06). This is non-trivial since the standard deviation of the dollar-debt ratio in the
pooled sample is 0.31. Hence, in addition to statistical significance, the e⇤ect of the reserves to GDP
is of practical relevance as well.
3 Robustness Checks
In this section I report the results of several robustness checks performed to validate the e⇤ect of
central bank reserves on firm dollar borrowing across di⇤erent scenarios.26
more expensive to issue, firms may disregard or underestimate the underlying currency risk and issue dollar debt.
Accordingly the predicted sign of r   r⇥ could potentially go in either direction.
25See, for example, Burnside et al (2001a). At the same time if the firm in question happens to be an exporter
with not as much dollar debt in its balance sheet, then an exchange rate depreciation will boost its export revenues
against which the firm can now issue more dollar debt. So the predicted sign of the rervol*dep dummy variable can
be ambiguous to some extent. The depreciation dummy is constructed such that it takes a value = 1 when change
in the real exchange rate from last year is positive and 0 otherwise. An increase in real exchange rate here means
depreciation. The appreciation dummy takes a value = 1 when change in thereal exchange rate from last year is
negative and 0 otherwise. The real exchange rate is constructed as nominal exchange rate divided by the CPI of the
respective country.
26In addition to those reported here, to ensure there is su⌅cient data for all firms, I deleted firms with less than
three years of data and re-estimated equation (1). Results were found to be robust to this specification.
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3.1 Alternative Measures of Liability Dollarization
I have so far normalized dollar denominated debt of firms by their total debt to facilitate comparison
across firms with di⇤erent magnitudes of liabilities. As additional robustness checks, I also estimate
equation (1) using two other measures of liability dollarization, namely the ratio of net dollar debt
(i.e. dollar liabilities - dollar assets) to total debt, and the ratio of dollar liabilities to total assets.
While net dollar debt in some sense represents currency mismatch in firm balance sheets (i.e. the
excess dollar debt not covered by dollar assets), the ratio of dollar debt to total assets facilitates
comparison across firms of di⇤erent size. The estimation results are presented in Table 4.
Column (1) shows the results for net dollar debt share and column (2) for dollar debt as a share of
total assets. The e⇤ect of the reserves to GDP ratio is consistently robust across both specifications.
When liability dollarization is measured as the share of net dollar debt in firm balance sheets, an
increase in reserves to GDP by one standard deviation (or 0.06 according to Table 2) is associated
with a higher dollar-debt ratio by by 3.4 percentage points (0.57x0.06). With dollar debt as the
share of firms total assets as the dependent variable, an increase in reserves to GDP by one stan-
dard deviation (or 0.06 according to Table 2) is associated with a higher dollar-debt ratio by by 3.5
percentage points (0.59x0.06). The estimated impact of the firm level explanatory variables is fairly
similar to the results in Table 2, in terms of sensible signs and statistical significance. Country-level
factors when significant have the expected signs.
3.2 Alternative Measures of International Reserves
Normalization of IR by an economy’s GDP facilitates comparison across economies of di⇤erent sizes.
While this normalization scheme is standard in the empirical literature on IR, it may understate
the role of other economic variables in assessing the adequacy of IR holding. For instance, Obstfeld,
Shambaugh and Taylor (2008) argue that when a country has open financial markets and aims to
stabilize the exchange rate system, it needs to hold reserves proportional to the size of its banking
system, proxied by M2. Thus, reserves normalized by M2 would facilitate comparison across my
sample of LATAM economies with varying sizes of banking systems. To assess the robustness of the
association between reserves and firm-level dollar debt to an alternative method of normalizing IR, I
re-estimate equation (1) using the ratio of reserves to M2 as my primary independent variable. The
estimation results for each of the three measures of firm-level of liability dollarization, are presented
in Table 5a.
Columns (1)-(3) show the estimated e⇤ect of country-level reserves to M2 on firm-level share
of dollar-debt in total debt, share of net dollar debt in total debt and share of dollar debt in total
assets, respectively. The e⇤ect of reserves is robust to the alternative normalization across all three
specifications. It is positive and statistically signicant with a p-value generally less than 0.001. The
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estimated impact of most of the other explanatory variables remains more or less the same, both
in terms of magnitude and sign. The di⇤erential cost of borrowing (r   r⇥) is now statistically
significant with the expected positive sign (a higher domestic cost of issuing debt encourages firms
to issue debt in dollars).
Another common metric used in assessing reserve adequacy in EMEs is the total external debt
of these economies. Accordingly I estimate equation (1), using the ratio of reserves to external
debt as my main independent variable. Results are reported in Table 5b. Once again, reserves as
a proxy for country-level insurance have a positive and statistically significant e⇤ect on corporate
liability dollarization ratios in two of the three specifications. All other explanatory variables have
the predicted signs and the coe⌃cients are mostly comparable to the results of the previous tables.27
3.3 Lagged Explanatory Variables
It is possible that most of the explanatory variables (other than reserves to GDP) in equation (1)
may themselves be a⇤ected by the share of dollar debt in firms’ balance sheets. Thus, to control
for potential feedback e⇤ects from the dependent to the independent variables, I lag all variables
by one period and check robustness of the results. I do this for each of the three measures of
liability dollarization, i.e. share of dollar debt in total debt, share of net dollar debt in total debt
and share of dollar debt in total assets. Results are presented in columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table
6 respectively. Each column includes the same explanatory variables as discussed in the previous
section. Reserves to GDP ratio lagged by one period consistently has the expected positive sign
across all three specifications and is significant as well. Thus, once again I find evidence that when
the level of reserves increases and an economy is possibly more insured against a speculative currency
attack, firms are induced to borrow more in dollars, perhaps owing to the implicit expectation that
central bank will use its reserves to stabilize the exchange rate. The explanatory power of the
variables, when lagged by one period across all three specifications are comparable to the results in
the previous tables.
3.4 Adding Sector Dummies
So far I have incorporated dummy variables controlling for the country level unobservable factors
that may vary over time and a⇤ect firm dollar borrowing decisions. However, there could also be
some factors that vary at the sectoral level such as a sector’s tradability or vulnerability to inflation
etc, that are not captured by the country dummies . Hence, in order to investigate whether the
e⇤ect of reserves on firms liability dollarization is robust to such sectoral unobservables, I incorpo-
rate dummies for the nine sectors in the data (identified using ISIC one digit classification). The
27In addition to these, I also added IMF credit lines received by the countries in my sample to their respective
stock of reserves and re-estimated equation (1) using this augmented definition of reserves as the main explanatory
variable. The results still hold and are available upon request.
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results are reported in Table 7. Reserves are normalized using a country’s GDP as in the baseline
specification of Table 3, and I include sector dummies for each of the three measures of firm dollar
debt share. The e⇤ect of reserves continues to be robust, positive and statistically significant, and
all other explanatory variables have the expected sign when significant.
4 Conclusion
In this study, I explore the possibility that implicit guarantee provided by the ex-ante accumu-
lation of foreign exchange reserves by EMEs may encourage corporate firms to issue more dollar
denominated debt. Using novel firm-level balance sheet data for close to 1500 firms across six major
LATAM economies, I estimate a simple model with Tobit regression technique and present evidence
that could provide support for my hypothesis under the scenarios investigated. I find that when the
stock of reserves accumulated by the central banks of these EMEs increases, firms increase the share
of dollar denominated debt in their balance sheets, possibly because they expect that the central
bank will use its reserves to stabilize the exchange rate in the face of an adverse external shock. My
results hold when controlled for firm-level determinants of dollar debt, including exports to sales
ratio, variable firm size, ownership structure and access to international equity markets. The results
are also robust to the inclusion of di⇤erential borrowing cost, real exchange rate volatility, financial
openness and the e⇤ect of financial crises. Furthermore, the impact of reserves on firm-level dollar
debt is sustained when I account for the fact that a significant fraction of the firms in my sample is-
sue zero dollar debt. The result also holds when I incorporate country, sector and year specific e⇤ects.
My study has shed new light on the e⇤ect of central banks’ reserve hoarding policy on firms’
risk-taking behavior with regard to using dollar denominated debt as well as on the factors de-
termining firms’ foreign currency borrowing. However, a better and more complete understanding
of the underlying dynamics requires information on o⇤-balance sheet items that can significantly
alter the overall currency exposure of a firm. This is particularly relevant in light of the substantial
growth and development of foreign currency derivative trading in EMEs in recent years. This is
left as a future exercise. The global financial crisis of 2008-09 is in many ways a watershed event,
not only for the developed nations but also for major EMEs such as those in the LATAM region.
In this context, an exercise such as the current one or future work in this direction maybe highly
informative regarding the impact of the crisis on non financial sector firms of EMEs. For instance
in a recent joint paper, using a comprehensive quarterly database with firm-level balance sheet data
for the same six countries as in this current study, I examine how LATAM firms pre-crisis financial
positions (such as liability dollarization) and international linkages a⇤ected their performance at the
peak of the global crisis of 2008-09.
An increase in the central bank’s stock of reserves should indicate a higher insurance against
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sudden stops in international capital flows and accompanying exchange rate depreciation. However,
this is relevant when the actions of the private sector of the economy are held constant, which need
not be true in practice. My paper provides empirical evidence in support of the finding that as an
economy’s self insurance improves (in the form of higher foreign exchange reserves), non financial
corporations’ currency-risk taking may go up (in the form of higher liability dollarization) thereby
making them more vulnerable to a negative shock such as a currency depreciation. This could be
interpreted as evidence in favor of a potential moral hazard situation wherein firms take advantage
of the implicit costless insurance provided by a higher stock of reserves. Such evidence could hint at
a possible paradox: a higher level of reserves need not necessarily signify an economy that is more
resilient to shocks. While reserve accumulation enables governments to weather external shocks,
it may also distort the incentives of the corporate sector. Thus central banks, while formulating
their foreign exchange intervention policies, may need to take into consideration the impact of the
resultant reserve stockpiling on the private sector.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Technical Appendix: Tobit Model
My baseline regressions which are Tobit model estimations, quantify the overall impact of reserves












⌥( ⇥1Rct +X ⇤ijct⇥2 + Z ⇤ct⇥3 +  j + ⇤c + ⌅t)
⇥
(4)
where ⇥ and ⌥ represent the CDF and the PDF respectively of a standard normal distribution. The
Tobit model weighs censored and uncensored observations di⇤erently from the standard normal.
The net result is a combination of a Probit likelihood function for censored values and the likelihood
of a normal distribution. Maximizing it over unknown parameters (⇥1,⇥2,⇥3, j , ⇤c, ⌅t) we obtain
the marginal e⇤ect on the latent variable (D⇥ijct).
However I am interested in the e⇤ect of the explanatory variables on the observed Dict (i.e. dollar
debt ratio of firms). In this model, the marginal e⇤ect of each variable on the expected value of
the dependent variable is given by the marginal e⇤ect on the latent variable times the probability
that the latent variable is above the censoring limit (in case of left censoring as is our case wherein




Dijct(Rct, X ⇤ijct, Z ⇤ct, j , ⇤c, ⌅t)
⇥
⌅Rct
= ⇥1 ⇥ P (D⇥ijct > 0) (5)
It is this overall marginal e⇤ect, indicated in equation (8) above that I report and discuss in section




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C below shows results of fixed e⇤ects panel estimations based on equation (1) in the text.
This estimation incorporations firm-specific e⇤ects and hence controls for unobserved heterogeneous
factors at the firm level that may a⇤ect firm dollar debt but that cannot be explicitly controlled for
owing to lack of data, such as risk appetite of firms, stock market value of firms, share of imported
inputs etc. However, such fixed e⇤ects linear estimation model does not take into account the
censored nature of the dependent variable and hence may produced biased coe⌃cient estimates.
Results show that the reserves to GDP ratio is consistently positive and significant implying that
a higher level of reserves (and hence higher insurance against a potential speculative attack) may
increase firms’ dollar borrowing.
Appendix: Table C: Firm Dollar-Debt and Central Bank Dollar-Reserves






firm size 3.500*** 3.304***
(0.745) (0.761)




r   r⇥ 0.058**
(0.029)
rervol ⇥ dep -6.587**
(4.442)








Country-Year Dummies Y Y
Observations 9852 9577
R2 0.108 0.110
Note: Columns (1) and (2) correspond to equation (1) in the text. Table reports results of fixed e ects estimations
on a panel dataset of all firms of all 6 LATAM countries in the sample. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
17
References
[1] Aghion, P., Bacchetta, P. and Banerjee, A. Currency Crises and Monetary Policy in an Economy
with Credit Constraints., 2001a: European Economic Review 45, 1121–1150.
[2] Aghion, P., Bacchetta, P. and Banerjee, A. A Corporate Balance-Sheet Approach to Currency
Crises., 2001b: Study Center Gerzensee, Working Paper No. 01.05.
[3] Aizenman, J. Large Hoarding of International Reserves and the Emerging Global Economic Ar-
chitecture, 2007: NBER Working Paper Series, no. 13277, 121.
[4] Aizenman, J. and Lee, J. International reserves: Precautionary versus Mercantilist Views, Theory
and Evidence, 2007: Open Economies Review 118(2): 191214.
[5] Allayannis, G., Brown, G. and Klapper, L. Capital Structure and Financial Risk: Evidence from
Foreign Debt Use in East Asia, 2003: Journal of Finance 58, 26672709.
[6] Arteta, C. Are Financially Dollarized economies More Prone to Costly Crises?, 2003: Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Papers no. 763.
[7] Benavente, J. M., Johnson, C. and Morande, F. Debt Composition and Balance Sheet E ects of
Exchange Rate Depreciations: a Firm-Level Analysis for Chile, 2003: Emerging Markets Review
4: 397 - 416.
[8] Bleakley, H. and Cowan, K. Corporate Dollar Debt and Depreciations: Much Ado About Noth-
ing?, 2008: Review of Economics and Statistics 90 (4) 612-626.
[9] Bonomo, M., Martins, B. and Pinto, R. Debt Composition and Exchange Rate Balance Sheet
E ect in Brazil: a firm-level Analysis, 2003: Emerging Markets Review 4: 368 - 96.
[10] Booth, L., Aivazian, V.,Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Maksimovic, V. Capital Structures in Develop-
ing economies, 2001: Journal of Finance 56, 87-120.
[11] Bordo, M., Meissner, C., and Stuckler, D.Foreign Currency Debt, Financial Crises and Eco-
nomic Growth: A Long Run View, 2009: NBER Working Paper Series, no. 15534, 149.
[12] Burnside, C., Eichenbaum, M. and Rebelo, S.Hedging and Financial Fragility in Fixed Exchange
Rate Regimes, 2001: European Economic Review 45: 1151-93.
[13] Caballero, R. and Krishnamurthy, A. Excessive Dollar Debt: Financial underdevelopment and
Underinsurance, 2003: Journal of Finance 58 (2) 867-893.
[14] Calvo, G., A. Izquierdo, and E. Talvi. Systemic Sudden Stops: The Relevance of Balance Sheet
E ects and Financial Integration, 2008: NBER Working Paper 14026.
18
[15] Calvo, G., A. Izquierdo, and E. Talvi. Sudden Stops, the Real Exchange Rate, and Fiscal Sus-
tainability: Argentina’s Lessons., 2003: Journal of Applied Economics 1(7): 3554.
[16] Calvo, G. and Reinhart, C. Fear of Floating, 2002: Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (3)
379-408.
[17] Cespedes, L., Chang, R. and Velasco, A. Balance Sheets and Exchange Rate Policy, 2004:
American Economic Review 94 (4) 1183-1193.
[18] Chamon, M. and Hausmann, R.Why do economies borrow the way they borrow? 2005: in Barry
Eichengreen and Ricardo Hausmann (eds.), Other People’s Money, 95-121. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
[19] Chang, R. and Velasco, A. Financial Fragility and the Exchange Rate Regime, 1999: NBER
Working Paper 7272.
[20] Cowan, K., Hansen, E. and Herrera, L. Currency Mismatches, Balance Sheet E ects and Hedg-
ing in Chilean non financial Corporations, 2004: in External Vulnerability and Preventive Poli-
cies, ed. by R. Caballero, C. Calderon, and L. F. Cespedes (Chile: Central Bank of Chile).
[21] Dooley, M. A Model of Crises in Emerging Markets, 2000: Economic Journal 110 (460)256-72.
[22] Dooley, M., Folkerts-Landau, D. and Garber, P. An essay on the revived Bretton Woods system,
2003: Working Paper No. 9971. Cambridge, MA: NBER.
[23] Dornbusch, R. A Primer on Emerging Market Crises, 2001: NBER Working Paper Series, no.
8326.
[24] Eichengreen, B. and Hausman, R. Exchange Rate and Financial Fragility, 1999: NBERWorking
Paper Series, no. 7418.
[25] Froot, K., Scharfstein, D. and Stein,J. Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment
and Financing Policies, 1993: The Journal of Finance 48, 1629-1658.
[26] Galindo, A., Panizza, U. and Schiantarelli,F. Debt Composition and Balance Sheet E ects of
Currency Depreciation: A Summary of the Micro Evidence, 2003 Emerging Markets Review 4(4),
33039.
[27] Goldstein, M. and Turner, P. Controlling Currency Mismatches in Emerging Market Economies,
2004: Institute of International Economics, Washington.
[28] Graham, J., and Harvey, C. The Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance: Evidence from the
Field, 2001: Journal of Financial Economics 60, 187-243.
[29] Hausmann, R., Panizza U and Stein E. Why Do economies Float the Way They Float?, 2001:
Journal of Development Economics 66 : 387-414.
19
[30] Hsiao, C., Analysis of Panel Data, 2003: Econometric Society Monographs, no. 34.
[31] Ize, A.and Yeyati, E.L. Financial Dollarization, 2003: Journal of International Economics, 59,
32347.
[32] Jeanne, O. Foreign Currency Debt and Global Financial Architecture, 2000: European Economic
Review 44: 719-27.
[33] Jeanne, O. and Zettlemeyer, J. Original Sin, Balance Sheet Crises and International Lend-
ing, 2005: in Barry Eichengreen and Ricardo Hausmann (eds.), Other People’s Money, 95-121.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[34] Kamil, H. A New Database on Currency and Maturity Composition of Firms’ Financial Struc-
tures in Latin America, 2004: Inter-American Development Bank. Washington. Mimeo.
[35] Kamil, H. How Do Exchange Rate Regimes A ect Firms Incentives to Hedge Currency Risk in
Emerging Markets?, 2009: Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund, unpublished.
[36] Kamil, H. and Sengupta, R. Financial Structure and Corporate Performance during the Global
Crisis: Micro Evidence for Latin America, 2010: Washington, D.C., International Monetary
Fund, unpublished.
[37] Kamin, S. Identifying the Role of Moral Hazard in International Financial Markets, 2002:
International Finance Discussion Papers,Number 736,Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
[38] Krugman, P. Balance Sheets, the Transfer Problem, and Financial Crises, 1999: 31-44, Peter
Isard, Assaf Razin and Andrew K. Rose, eds, International Finance and International Crises,
International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.
[39] Martinez, L. andWerner, A. The exchange rate regime and the currency composition of corporate
debt: the Mexican experience, 2002: 315-334, Journal of Development Economics 69 (2).
[40] McKinnon R and Pill, H. International Overborrowing: A Decomposition of Credit and Currency
Risks, 1998: World Development 7 :1267-82.
[41] Myers, S. Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 1977: Journal of Financial Economics, 5, 2,
147-75.
[42] Myers, S. and Majluf, N. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have infor-
mation that investors do not have, 1984: Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 187-221.
[43] Obstfeld, M., J. C. Shambaugh and A. M. Taylor. Financial Stability, the Trilemma, and
International Reserves, 2008: NBER Working Paper Series, no. 14217.
20
[44] Patnaik, I. and Shah, A. Does the Currency Regime Shape Unhedged Currency Exposure?, 2010:
Journal of International Money and Finance 29: 760-69.
[45] Pratap S., Lobato, I. and Somuano, A. Debt Composition and Balance Sheet E ects of Exchange
Rate Volatility in Mexico: a firm-level Analysis, 2003: Emerging Markets Review 4 : 450 - 71.
[46] Ross, S. The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach 1977:
Bell Journal of Economics 8, 23-40.
[47] Schmukler, S. and Vesperoni, E. Globalization and Firms’ Financing Choices: Evidence from
Emerging Economies,2001: William Davidson Working Paper Number 388.
[48] Schneider, M. and Tornell, A. Balance Sheet E ects, Bailout Guarantees and Financial
Crises,2004: Review of Economic Studies.

































































$++(# $++)# $++*# $++,# $+++# %!!!# %!!$# %!!%# %!!&# %!!'# %!!(# %!!)# %!!*#
!"#$%&'(()*+,,-.%
-./0123# 24556-72.89094965#2.89#
FIGURE 1: The figures above plot the reserve to GDP ratios of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and
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FIGURE 2: This figure shows the average reserve to GDP ratio of the pooled sample (Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) over the period 1995-2007, and the annual average firm-level dollar liabilities to total































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics by Country
Variables Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru All
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Firm-Level Variables
Dollar debt/Total debt(%) 53.9 19.0 19.2 8.3 37.3 58.3 29.1
(std. dev.) (30.9) (20.6) (28.5) (16.1) (30.6) (28.2) (31.0)
Net Dollar debt/Total debt (%) 38.2 18.5 -15.0 4.4 21.1 13.2 10.3
(std. dev.) (49.8) (19.5) (91.4) (14.1) (37.0) (72.7) (62.2)
Dollar debt/Total assets(%) 29.8 17.4 7.1 3.9 20.6 28.6 16.8
(std. dev.) (25.7) (239.7) (12.7) (9.1) (23.7) (22.4) (127.9)
Exports/Sales(%) 7.8 11.1 6.2 10.3 16.9 16.9 10.8
(std. dev.) (17.7) (20.5) (18.1) (20.9) (23.3) (27.8) (21.4)
Total assets(billions USD) 0.5 1.9 0.3 0.2 1.4 0.2 0.93
(std. dev.) (1.3) (7.0) (0.8) (0.5) (3.5) (0.4) (4.2)
Access to Foreign Stock Mkts 11.0 15.0 8.0 2.0 34.0 5.0 12.5
(in %: Yes=1, No=0)
(std. dev.) (31.0) (35.0) (27.0) (14.0) (47.0) (21.0) (33.0)
Foreign Ownership 42.0 30.0 19.0 22.0 37.0 33.0 29.5
(in %: Yes=1, No=0)
(std. dev.) (49.0) (46.0) (40.0) (41.0) (48.0) (47.0) (45.6)
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Country-Level Variables (%)
Reserves/GDP 9.0 6.8 18.8 10.1 7.2 17.5 11.2
(std. dev.) (3.1) (1.8) (3.4) (1.0) (1.0) (2.2) (5.5)
Reserves/M2 33.3 16.6 41.4 42.8 27.1 65.4 34.0
(std. dev.) (10.3) (3.8) (10.4) (14.4) (5.5) (14.2) (18.0)
Reserves/Debt 17.1 25.0 45.1 32.3 25.6 40.1 30.7
(std. dev.) (6.0) (13.5) (11.6) (5.6) (11.3) (16.0) (7.2)
r   r⇥ 12.5 59.2 5.9 21.5 17.1 23.1 26.5
(std. dev.) (14.4) (15.2) (2.0) (10.6) (15.0) (4.1) (23.6)
FinancialOpenness 11.4 7.0 18.2 9.1 6.8 7.6 10.2
(std. dev.) (4.7) (2.1) (6.9) (2.6) (1.7) (2.7) (5.9)
Panel A columns report avg. values across all firms in each country.
Panel B columns report average values across all years in each country.
Last Column in both panels reports avg. values across all countries pooled.
Source: Author’s own calculations based on the firm-level database described in the text. Columns in Panel A report
average values across all firms in each country. Columns in Panel B report average values across all years in each
country. The last column reports average values across all firms and years in the pooled sample of all six countries.
*(in %; Yes =1, No=0)
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TABLE 3: Firm Dollar-Debt and Central Bank Dollar-Reserves






firm size 3.391*** 3.418***
(0.185) (0.190)




r   r⇥ 0.011
(0.013)
rervol ⇥ dep -3.177**
(1.649)








Country-Year Dummies Y Y
Observations 9852 9577
Uncensored Obs. (in percent) 77.1 77.0
McFadden’s Adj. R2 0.543 0.539
Note: Column (3) corresponds to equation (1) in the text. Table shows results of Tobit regressions over the sample
period 1995-2007 for non financial firms of all six LATAM economies. reserves/GDP is international reserves scaled
by GDP of each country, exports/sales is the ratio of firm-level exports and sales, firm size is variable firm size
measures by log of total assets, adr gdr is a dummy variable denoting whether the firm is listed in a foreign stock
exchange, rervol*dep and rervol*app are volatility of exchange rate of each country interacted with a depreciation and
an appreciation dummy respectively. r-r* and finopen are the di erence between domestic and external borrowing
costs and financial openness of an economy, respectively. Coe⌅cient estimates denote marginal e ects on dependent
variable, evaluated at mean values of independent variables. For dummies, it is the e ect of discrete changes from 0
to 1. Robust Standard errors clustered at country-year level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the
1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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TABLE 4: Alternative Measures of Liability Dollarization





firm size 2.810*** 4.205***
(0.139) (0.139)




r   r⇥ 0.002 0.001
(0.007) (0.007)
rervol ⇥ dep -3.164*** 0.183
(0.797) (0.797)








Country-Year Dummies Y Y
Observations 8530 9577
Uncensored Obs. (in percent) 61.4 77.0
McFadden’s Adj. R2 0.359 0.022
Note: Table shows results of Tobit regressions over the sample period 1995-2007 for non financial firms of all six
LATAM economies. All explanatory variables are as in Table 3. Coe⌅cient estimates denote marginal e ects on
dependent variable, evaluated at mean values of independent variables. For dummies, it is the e ect of discrete
changes from 0 to 1. Robust Standard errors clustered at country-year level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
signicance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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TABLE 5a: Alternative Measure of Reserves
Indep.Vars. (Dollar debt/Total debt) (Net Dollar debt/Total debt) (Dollar Debt/Total Assets)
reserves/M2 0.429*** 0.181*** 0.189**
(0.111) (0.048) (0.087)
exports/sales 0.249*** 0.072*** 0.221***
(0.016) (0.010) (0.053)
firm size 3.377*** 2.815*** 4.343***
(0.201) (0.143) (0.919)
adr gdr 4.706*** 0.708 2.341**
(0.538) (0.764) (1.059)
forown 2.900*** 1.810*** 3.623***
(0.535) (0.629) (1.046)
r   r⇥ 0.042*** 0.016*** 0.015*
(0.008) (0.003) (0.009)
rervol ⇥ dep 4.390** -0.026 3.258*
(2.233) (0.945) (1.754)
rervol ⇥ app 17.231*** 15.614*** 8.283***
(2.583) (1.098) (2.219)
finopen -0.025 -0.015 0.089
(0.113) (0.046) (0.099)
crisis 11.870*** 10.870*** 4.293***
(1.192) (0.510) (1.345)
Constant -96.828*** -116.580*** -261.122***
(11.876) (8.746) (66.829)
Country-Year Dummies Y Y Y
Observations 8801 7890 8801
Uncensored Obs. (in percent) 77.0 61.3 77.0
McFadden’s Adj. R2 0.541 0.362 0.022
Note: Columns (1) and (2) correspond to equation (1) in the text. All explanatory variables are as in Table 3.
Coe⌅cient estimates denote marginal e ects on dependent variable, evaluated at mean values of independent variables.
For dummies, it is the e ect of discrete changes from 0 to 1. Robust Standard errors clustered at country-year level
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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TABLE 5b: Alternative Measure of Reserves
Indep.Vars. (Dollar debt/Total debt) (Net Dollar debt/Total debt) (Dollar Debt/Total Assets)
reserves/debt 1.044*** 0.447*** 0.303
(0.359) (0.150) (0.294)
exports/sales 0.248*** 0.072*** 0.221***
(0.016) (0.010) (0.053)
firm size 3.377*** 2.815*** 4.343***
(0.201) (0.143) (0.919)
adr gdr 4.708*** 0.709 2.342**
(0.538) (0.764) (1.059)
forown 2.898*** 1.809*** 3.623***
(0.536) (0.629) (1.047)
r   r⇥ 0.027*** 0.010** 0.008
(0.012) (0.005) (0.011)
rervol ⇥ dep 4.881* 0.221 2.505
(2.635) (1.094) (2.334)
rervol ⇥ app 25.259*** 19.090*** 9.511***
(4.026) (1.724) (3.242)
finopen 0.133 0.052 0.140
(0.142) (0.057) (0.118)
crisis 0.292 6.492*** -0.162
(2.585) (0.911) (2.262)
Constant -96.048*** -114.228*** -261.712***
(7.829) (6.839) (66.580)
Country-Year Dummies Y Y Y
Observations 8801 7890 8801
Uncensored Obs. (in percent) 77.0 61.3 77.0
McFadden’s Adj. R2 0.541 0.362 0.022
Note: Columns (1) and (2) correspond to equation (1) in the text. All explanatory variables are as in Table 3.
Coe⌅cient estimates denote marginal e ects on dependent variable, evaluated at mean values of independent variables.
For dummies, it is the e ect of discrete changes from 0 to 1. Robust Standard errors clustered at country-year level
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
29
TABLE 6: With Lagged Explanatory Variables
Indep.Vars. (Dollar debt/Total debt) (Net Dollar debt/Total debt) (Dollar Debt/Total Assets)
L.reserves/GDP 0.928*** 0.322*** 0.334***
(0.106) (0.045) (0.121)
L.exports/sales 0.240*** 0.065*** 0.210***
(0.016) (0.010) (0.051)
L.firm size 3.409*** 2.800*** 4.489***
(0.197) (0.139) (1.010)
L.adr gdr 5.020*** 0.841*** 2.331***
(0.572) (0.759) (0.965)
L.forown 2.665*** 1.612*** 3.247***
(0.500) (0.614) (0.919)
L.r   r⇥ -0.018* -0.063*** -0.004
(0.010) (0.004) (0.018)
L.rervol ⇥ dep 11.963*** 6.385*** 5.785***
(0.537) (0.305) (0.846)
L.rervol ⇥ app 28.263*** 13.409*** 10.320***
(1.284) (0.720) (2.514)
L.finopen -0.003 0.012 0.040
(0.022) (0.016) (0.058)
crisis 15.714*** 11.956*** 5.547***
(0.416) (0.306) (0.505)
Constant -96.048*** -114.228*** -261.712***
(7.829) (6.839) (66.58)
Country-Year Dummies Y Y Y
Observations 9170 8025 9170
Uncensored Obs. (in percent) 76.5 59.9 76.5
McFadden’s Adj. R2 0.542 0.362 0.023
Note: Columns (1) to (3) correspond to equation (1) in the text. All explanatory variables are as in Table 3. Coe⌅cient
estimates denote marginal e ects on dependent variable, evaluated at mean values of independent variables. For
dummies, it is the e ect of discrete changes from 0 to 1. Robust Standard errors clustered at country-year level in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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TABLE 7: Adding Sector Dummies
Indep.Vars. (Dollar debt/Total debt) (Net Dollar debt/Total debt) (Dollar Debt/Total Assets)
reserves/GDP 1.144*** 0.591*** 0.753***
(0.199) (0.156) (0.250)
exports/sales 0.223*** 0.076*** 0.180***
(0.014) (0.008) (0.042)
firm size 3.382*** 2.687*** 4.111***
(0.179) (0.124) (0.885)
adr gdr 4.815*** 0.712 2.389**
(0.504) (0.715) (0.948)
forown 2.162*** 1.275** 2.150***
(0.507) (0.603) (0.794)
r   r⇥ 0.010 0.001 -0.001
(0.014) (0.007) (0.016)
rervol ⇥ dep -2.560* -.894*** 1.739
(1.667) (0.826) (1.945)
rervol ⇥ app 17.739*** 15.962*** 7.442***
(2.216) (1.241) (2.402)
finopen 0.222*** 0.115*** 0.185*
(0.083) (0.044) (0.104)
crisis 11.778*** 11.047*** 4.770***
(0.628) (0.431) (1.068)
Constant -94.088*** -119.591*** -262.916***
(7.501) (7.742) (66.73)
Country-Year Dummies Y Y Y
Sector Dummies Y Y Y
Observations 9577 8530 9577
Uncensored Obs. (in percent) 77.0 61.4 77.0
McFadden’s Adj. R2 0.565 0.372 0.025
Note: Columns (1) and (2) correspond to equation (1) in the text. All explanatory variables are as in Table 3.
Coe⌅cient estimates denote marginal e ects on dependent variable, evaluated at mean values of independent variables.
For dummies, it is the e ect of discrete changes from 0 to 1. Robust Standard errors clustered at country-year level
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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